By Dr. James Strong, a Fellow in Foreign Policy Analysis and International Relations at the London School of Economics and Political Science
First, when
will the Brexit negotiations begin? This morning David Cameron broke two
promises he made during the referendum campaign. He resigned as Prime Minister.
And he announced that he would not immediately inform the European Council that
Britain wishes to withdraw from the EU, in line with Article 50 of the
Lisbon Treaty.
This is
significant. Once a state activates Article 50, it has two years to negotiate
its future relationship with the remaining 27 member states. After two years
its membership terminates automatically.
Cameron’s
successor, presumably Boris Johnson, will have to decide in October whether or
not to invoke Article 50. Early in the campaign, Johnson suggested that Britain
might yet be able to wring a better deal (e.g. further restrictions on freedom
of movement) out of other EU states if the government already had a mandate to
leave.
Most EU leaders
have ruled out this option. But that doesn’t mean they won’t consider now.
Remember, most didn’t take the prospect of Brexit entirely seriously during the
previous round of negotiations. And even if they did take the prospect
seriously, it makes no sense from a bargaining perspective to admit that you
are willing to offer more to a bargaining partner who does something you don’t
want.
We could yet
see a second re-negotiation followed by a second referendum in which Prime
Minister Johnson successfully campaigns for Remain, having achieved his primary
goal by becoming Prime Minister.
Second, what
sort of mandate does the leave camp have? Two key concerns appear to have
driven the leave vote - fear of mass immigration and a desire to repatriate
sovereign authority currently pooled with other EU states, for example the
power to alter employment regulations or to negotiate new free trade deals.
To an extent
these concerns can both be resolved by leaving the EU. But many of those who
argue for a leave vote on sovereignty grounds nevertheless still want Britain
to have the best possible trading relationship with other EU states, which
makes sense since most of our exports go to them. They say they would like
Britain to stay in the European single market as far as possible.
Both Norway and
Switzerland are in the single market but not the EU, so there is precedent
here. The problem is that the rest of the EU sees free movement of people as
one of the fundamental pillars of the single market. In other words, the price
of retaining access to the EU market is likely to be allowing free movement of
people. There is a fundamental clash between the desire to remake Britain as a
free-trading nation and the desire to restrict immigration (this is true
conceptually as much as in practice).
So what sort of
deal will the post-leave government pursue? I suspect the answer is that it
will be unable to negotiate a deal because it will be unable to concede on free
movement, leaving Britain outside of the single market by default at the end of
its two year withdrawal period.
Thirdly, and
relatedly, what sort of deal will parliament approve? Most MPs favour remaining
in the EU, but they will have to sign off on any post-Brexit agreement. Will
they be willing to do so in principle? Probably, given most have more respect
for the electorate than is often implied.
But, again,
what sort of deal will they have a mandate to approve? One that retains access
to the single market at the cost of allowing free movement, or one that cuts
off both? The differences are stark, and the reality is that the leave vote is
split between the two broad approaches. There will have to be a second
referendum, like it or not.
Fourthly, what
happens if there is an early general election before the two years are up? This
is entirely possible, though the Fixed Terms Parliament Act sets a high bar
(assuming the government does not lose a confidence vote, which it probably
wouldn’t, two-thirds of MPs have to vote for an early election, which means
both Labour and the Conservatives have to be confident they’ll win).
It could happen
if the Conservative Party splits, which looks like a realistic possibility. It
could also happen if the worst economic predictions of the Remain camp come
true. If the hit to business confidence already apparent in the markets
continues into a recession, that in turn could undermine the government’s
position.
The prospect of
an early election is interesting for this reason: What if the Labour Party
campaigns on a pro-EU mandate, and wins? Could a new government withdraw the
Article 50 notification before the two year period is up? Article 50 doesn’t
say, which means presumably the possibility is there. But it would have to be
negotiated, and Europe may be in no mood for second guessing.
The Brexit
debate is far from over, in other words. One way or another there will have to
be a further vote.
